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Takings Liability and Coastal Management in
Massachusetts
Updated fall 2020
This fact sheet was produced by the Marine Affairs Institute at Roger Williams University School of Law/Rhode Island Sea Grant Legal
Program with funding from Rhode Island Sea Grant. This is one of a series of fact sheets designed to highlight key concepts of state and local
government liability risks as those governments prepare for the effects of climate change throughout New England. This fact sheet was produced
in partnership with MIT Sea Grant and Woods Hole Sea Grant. This fact sheet was initially written by Melissa Chalek, Policy Analyst at
the Marine Affairs Institute, and was updated by Institute staff during the fall of 2020.

Some scholars fear that governments “are failing to take aggressive steps to address the risks of sealevel rise” out of fear of prompting “takings” litigation.1 Takings liability is among the most
commonly asserted claims against municipalities, particularly where land use decisions limit the
development of valuable land in coastal areas. This document explains what takings are and how
takings lawsuits may apply to coastal management decisions. After introducing the fundamental
concepts of takings law, it specifically addresses potential takings claims associated with coastal
permitting decisions and the construction and management of coastal infrastructure. This fact sheet
is provided solely for educational purposes and does not provide legal advice.

1 What is a taking?
The takings clause requires the government to provide “just compensation” to any person whose
property is “taken” for a public use.2 Both the U.S. and the Massachusetts constitutions include a
takings clause. While plaintiffs can sue under either constitution, there is “no substantial difference
in [their] interpretation.”3 Thus, takings cases apply in Massachusetts even if they involve actions in
other states.
For a taking to occur, the plaintiff must satisfy two prerequisites. First, the plaintiff must have lost a
property interest recognized under state law.4 For example, Massachusetts law does not recognize a
property right to a view, so loss of view cannot be a taking in that state.5 Second, the loss must result
from governmental action for the benefit of the public.6 Thus, damage caused solely by natural forces or by a
private party do not result in takings,7 and inaction, such as failure to maintain infrastructure, is not a
taking (though it may be a tort).8 For example, failure to inform the public about flood risk is
unlikely to be a taking. In addition, not every affirmative government action that interferes in
property is a taking—the action must be for public benefit.9 If the prerequisites are met in a

particular case, the court will engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a taking has
occurred.10
If a court determines that a taking has occurred, the plaintiff will receive compensation. The amount
of compensation is the fair market value of the property interest that was taken.11 If part of a
property is taken, the plaintiff will receive the value only of that part; for example, the value of an
easement is calculated as the difference in the value of the property before and after the easement
was taken.12 The compensation may also be reduced or eliminated where the government action
directly benefits the property owner.13

2 Types of takings
Courts consider the means, duration, and impact of government action to determine what law to apply
to the facts of each case.14
•
•
•

The means of a taking can include a physical taking or a regulatory taking.15
The duration of a taking may be temporary or permanent.16
The impact of a taking may be categorical (also known as per se or practical confiscation) or
partial.17

In the coastal context, takings cases can arise from any combination of these categories. Physical
takings may result from a variety of government actions, such as infrastructure development,
shoreline protection structures (by erosion of neighboring land), or flood management decisions.18
Regulatory takings often arise from land use restrictions, such as setbacks or denial of building
permits, which can categorically or partially restrict the use of private land. Government action may
cause temporary takings, such as flooding, or permanently occupy land or restrict its use. By
understanding how courts decide takings cases, coastal municipalities can identify when their actions
may result in a taking and help them decide whether and how to proceed with a planned action.

2.1 Physical Takings
Physical takings involve occupation of private property and may result from intentional occupation
of private land or from government actions that foreseeably result in occupation of private property.
Even a temporary physical invasion, such as by floodwater after a storm, may constitute a taking.19
And any physical occupation, no matter how small, is categorically considered a taking.20
Eminent domain and condemnation are well-recognized forms of physical takings that occupy
private property and can arise in coastal protection projects. For example, government construction
of a dune system on private property was a taking, although damages were minimal because of the
benefits provided to the landowners.21 Coastal infrastructure projects that require the occupation of
any private land in the form of an easement or complete property transfer will require compensation
as a result of either a voluntary agreement or takings litigation.
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Government actions that indirectly occupy private lands are also regarded as physical takings. For
example, a regulation requiring landlords to allow installation of a cable box on their property was a
taking, despite the cable box occupying only a small area.22 For a government action to cause a
physical taking, the harm must be a predictable result of the action and have a sufficiently substantial
impact on the plaintiffs.23 These conditions can be met for coastal projects and infrastructure
management decisions—especially those that cause flooding or erosion, as discussed in more detail
below.

2.2 Regulatory Takings
Massachusetts and its municipalities can implement regulations to promote the public health, safety,
and welfare. Zoning and land use regulations limit how property owners can use their land and not
infrequently give rise to takings claims. Most of these regulatory takings claims are reviewed as
partial takings.
Regulations rarely result in categorical takings because this category of claims requires the plaintiff to
have suffered a complete deprivation of all economically viable use of their property.24 In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, the parties stipulated that a regulation requiring land on a barrier island
“to be left substantially in its natural state” rendered the property valueless, and the Supreme Court
found that this deprivation required the government to compensate its owner.25 However, a
regulation leaving any residual value—even 5% of the property’s pre-regulation value—is not a
categorical taking.26 Thus, a 32-month moratorium on development around Lake Tahoe was not a
categorical taking because the property subject to the moratorium retained residual value.27 Similarly,
in James v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Pembroke, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals found no
categorical taking of a subdivided parcel where town zoning regulations prohibited development,
because the property could be used for “woodland, wetland, or recreational use, or as additional
acreage for residential abutters.”28 Thus, a regulatory taking claim will likely be categorized as a
partial taking unless the plaintiff can prove that a regulation has left a property valueless.
Most regulatory takings cases are reviewed as partial takings because they diminish, but do not
extinguish, property value. These cases are founded on the recognition that “while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”29 There is
“no set formula” for deciding these cases;30 rather, cases are decided based on a highly fact-specific
inquiry. The Supreme Court has identified three factors that courts must consider when evaluating
regulatory partial takings cases:
•
•
•

“the character of the governmental action;”
“[t]he economic impact” on the property owner; and
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.”31

Massachusetts courts have upheld a range pf coastal land use regulations against partial takings
challenges.32 For example, in Gove v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, the plaintiff owned property
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in a coastal conservancy overlay district where development was limited to specific, non-residential
uses.33 The owner sued the town for a taking after a prospective buyer was denied a building
permit.34 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court analyzed the takings claim under the threefactor test.35 It found that the “character” of the conservation district ordinance was the “the type of
limited protection against harmful private land use that routinely has withstood allegations of
regulatory takings”36 – a conclusion supported by the factual record, which showed that the
conservancy district was intended for “the protection of rescue workers and residents, the
effectiveness of the town’s resources to respond to natural disasters, and the preservation of
neighboring property.”37 The plaintiff had also failed to prove that the regulation caused a decline in
the value of the property or interfered with her investment-backed expectations because she failed
to provide a property assessment and because natural hazards—notably, a breach in the barrier
island leading to increased erosion—had already reduced the property value before the regulation
was adopted.38 As a result, the plaintiff failed to show that “she ever had any reasonable expectation of
selling that particular lot for residential development, or that she has suffered any substantial loss as
a result of the regulations.”39 As a result, the court found in Chatham’s favor.
The Gove case illustrates several important considerations for municipal land use officials. First, while
zoning regulations are often challenged, their character is not problematic in most cases. Rather,
plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered a substantial economic deprivation causally tied to the
regulation they are challenging. As the court noted in Gove, the value of coastal properties that are
“exposed to the ravages of nature” can decline for a number of reasons, including not only
regulations but also environmental conditions and speculation.40 The facts in the record in each
particular case are likely to be determinative of the outcome of partial regulatory takings litigation.
Municipalities therefore can prepare for takings challenges by documenting the reasons supporting
their land use ordinances.

3 Takings in the Coastal Context
Coastal hazards, such as sea level rise and storm surge, create special risks for coastal properties.
Municipal responses to these risks can and do result in takings litigation. This section reviews the
potential for takings liability based on permitting decisions and infrastructure construction and
management.

3.1 Land Use Permitting
Massachusetts municipalities may be exposed to takings litigation in the coastal context for several
reasons. Lawsuits may result from denial of permit applications, (allegedly) improvident issuance of
permits, and issuance of permits for activities that impact neighboring properties. This section
briefly reviews each category of claim.
First, applicants frequently allege takings for denial of permits, including building permit denial due
to coastal hazards. As in the Gove case, Massachusetts courts have typically declined to find takings
for building permit denial because the need to protect the public against coastal hazards is sufficient
to justify reasonable restrictions on private development rights.41 However, the facts of specific
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cases, and particularly the economic impacts and investment-backed expectations of plaintiffs, will
determine the outcome of particular lawsuits.
Second, permit-holders may seek to recover if a permit improvidently authorizes activity without
accounting for coastal hazards, such as for structures destroyed in a hurricane. No cases were
identified in the research for this fact sheet claiming that issuance of a permit was a taking of
property because the government should have known that the permitted activity was unsafe or
unsustainable.42 Instead, most cases arising from issued permits address the legality of permit
conditions. These cases require that permit conditions requiring “exactions” of easements or
funding, such as public easements for access to the shore or in-lieu fees for wetlands mitigation, are
takings unless they “have an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the impacts of a proposed
development.”43 Thus, while permit conditions may result in takings litigation, it is unlikely that
landowners will successfully sue municipalities for failing to prevent them from undertaking
hazardous activities.
Finally, landowners may sue municipalities for issuing permits to their neighbors for activities which
damage their properties. In contrast to a few decisions in other jurisdictions,44 Massachusetts courts
have declined to find takings liability when the government permits an action that subsequently
harms a neighbor’s property. For example, in Woods v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection, the Woods’ claimed that the Department committed a taking by authorizing a neighbor to
construct revetments that caused erosion on the Woods’ property and failing to enforce conditions
in those permits requiring beach nourishment.45 The court found “no compelling reason to extend
Massachusetts takings law to encompass a situation” where the government had not built or
required private owners to build shoreline protection structures.46 However, in rare cases, coastal
protection by non-governmental entities has been a taking. In Banks v. U.S., the government was
liable for erosion caused by privately-constructed jetties because those jetties were themselves
constructed to address erosion caused by the government’s own jetties.47 Thus, while the
government usually is not liable for damages caused by private actors, this rules may not apply when
the government motivates the private action.

3.2 Municipal Infrastructure
Coastal municipalities often have a substantial amount of infrastructure along the coast, such as
sewage treatment systems, roadways, jetties or groins, and dams or water retention facilities. Coastal
infrastructure construction and management can lead to takings liability when it causes or
contributes to flooding, coastal erosion, or loss of access to private property.48
In recent years, extreme storm events have resulted in numerous takings lawsuits stemming from
flood management decisions. The Supreme Court held in 2012 that flooding, including temporary
flooding, is a physical occupation of property and can be a taking.49 Thus, a change in management
of a federal dam that flooded and destroyed timber in bottomland hardwood forests was a taking.50
Similarly, the federal government was liable for flooding “upstream” plaintiffs who owned property
above a federal dam following Hurricane Harvey because the dam owner, the U.S. Army Corps of
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Engineers, knew that flooding of those properties was likely when it constructed the dams.51 The
Court therefore found that the Corps had taken a “flowage easement” on the affected properties.
When government flood management foreseeably will cause flooding of private property, the courts
have not hesitated to find that a taking has occurred.
While the courts have clarified that government-caused flooding is a taking, these holdings are
limited by issues of causation and relative harm. The Corps prevailed in its defense against
“downstream” plaintiffs flooded during Hurricane Harvey because Texas law did not require the
dam owner to guarantee perfect flood control: the downstream properties would have been flooded
whether or not the dam was present.52 Similarly, the government did not take property when it raised
lake levels behind a dam to prevent a levee breach.53 Applying the “relative benefits doctrine,” the
court determined that a breach of the levee would have caused worse damage to the plaintiffs’
properties than they suffered in reality, so they had no claim for compensation.54 Municipalities
should be aware that temporary, storm-induced flooding caused by municipal-owned infrastructure
can be a taking, but that causation, foreseeability, and other issues will affect liability.
Several notable decisions have found governments liable for takings associated with groins, jetties,
and other coastal and navigation infrastructure. This infrastructure can interrupt sediment transport
along the coast, resulting in increased erosion of down-drift properties. While it can be difficult for
property owners to prove that government infrastructure caused the erosion,55 especially given
confounding factors such as storms and sea level rise, courts have consistently found the
government liable when plaintiffs prove causation. For example, in Banks v. U.S., property owners
recovered for erosion caused by a Corps-owned jetty protecting a navigable channel for harbor
access.56 Thus, government-owned shoreline protection or harbor management structures that
increase erosion on nearby properties are likely to require compensation.
Coastal roadways are a third potential source of takings liability for municipalities. Coastal roadways
in Massachusetts are flooding at increasing rates and may be damaged due to sea level rise and
erosion, leading municipalities to consider discontinuance of affected roadways.57 Courts in several
states have found that loss of access to the public road system is a compensable property right that
can support a takings claim.58 Takings claims arising from discontinuance in Massachusetts would be
difficult, as state courts have limited damages from discontinuance to instances where a parcel is
rendered entirely landlocked and no longer has any access to a public road.59 Thus, while coastal
highway management decisions could result in a takings claim under limited circumstances, these
cases are limited in scope.

4 Conclusion
Massachusetts municipalities face several forms of potential takings claims when managing coastal
property. Because takings law is rooted in the state and federal constitutions, state and local
legislation cannot limit liability risk. Therefore, governments should consider potential claims when
making coastal management decisions. If a government is willing to pay fair compensation for lost
property rights, then it has broad authority to regulate or physically appropriate land for a public
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purpose. However, if a government wishes to regulate private property without incurring the costs
of takings claims, then it will need to (1) avoid physical appropriation of property; (2) avoid
eliminating the entire economic use of the property through regulation; and (3) ensure that the
benefits of the regulation are well-documented and outweigh harms to individual private property
owners. Because regulatory takings cases are decided on the basis of a fact-specific analysis, it may
be difficult for a government to predict whether a given regulation, permit decision, or infrastructure
decision will result in a taking. Governments can prepare for possible claims by considering the
effects of their decisions on private parties and documenting the reasons and evidence supporting
their decisions.
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